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NATO should be careful not to let the back to 
basics rhetoric steal the show at the 2016 
Warsaw Summit. By moving away from out-of-
area operations with a crisis management 
focus back to its original purpose  collective 
defence  NATO will become irrelevant in the 
long run.
The problem is that going back to basics sounds like 
an intentional limitation of NATOs role in the 21st 
century, and it implies a downgrading of NATOs two 
other core tasks: cooperative security and crisis 
OCPCIGOGPV6JGVJTGGEQTGVCUMUYGTGKFGPVKƒGFKP
the 2010 Strategic Concept as essential if the Alliance 
YCUVQTGOCKPƒVHQTVJGst century. Having multiple 
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RECOMMENDATIONS
Q End the rhetoric suggesting a return to basics and 
instead focus on implementing the decisions from 
VJG9CNGU5WOOKVCUCƒTUVUVGRVQYCTFUTGRCKTKPI
damage from years of under-investment.
Q Use NATOs partnerships to strengthen the anchor 
of liberal order  cooperative security should be 
seen as an essential tool of statecraft in a shifting 
strategic environment.
Q Forge a new transatlantic bargain suitable for the 
21st century in which the United States contributes 
unique capabilities in return for European NATO 
meeting security challenges through crisis manage-
ment in Europes neighbourhood.
An agenda for NATOs 2016 Warsaw Summit
BACK TO BASICS OR JUST BACKWARDS?
roles has served the Alliance well in the past. 
Moreover, important as the changes in the 
relationship with Russia are, the changes in the global 
strategic environment, which led NATO to codify its 
VJTGGEQTGVCUMUKPVJGƒTUVRNCEGCTGUVKNNKPRNC[
$ ?H[LEOHDQGDGDSWDEOH$OOLDQFH
The Alliance is  and always was  more than just a 
defence alliance. This is clearly stated in the Washing-
ton Treaty, which emphasizes both collective defence 
(Article Five) and cooperative security (Article Two). 
Moreover, following the end of the Cold War, the 
Alliance added the role of crisis management through 
a growing practice of meeting security challenges 
outside NATOs own geographical area. Had NATO 
been just a defence alliance, just doing territorial 
defence, it would have had no raison detre and would 
probably have disappeared along with the Cold War. 
It was recently pointed out by NATOs Secretary 
General, Jens Stoltenberg, that one of NATOs greatest 
strengths is its ability to adapt in response to changes 
in its strategic environment. The ability to do so stems 
directly from the Alliance standing on three legs rather 
than just one. During the Cold War, NATO focused 
almost exclusively on collective defence, whereas the 
post-Cold War period has been characterized by a 
focus on cooperative security through NATOs 
growing circle of partnerships and increasingly  
though at times reluctantly  on crisis management 
through NATOs many operations. 
In response to the dramatic deterioration in the 
relationship with Russia, the temptation is to go back 
to basics to focus primarily, or even exclusively, on 
collective defence. Such a move would make sense if 
the Alliance was going back to a strategic environ-
ment similar to that of the Cold War. That, however, 
would not be an accurate reading of the emerging 
global security environment.
The nature of change in the security environment
It is tempting to think that the changes NATO has to 
TGURQPFVQCTGŧUKORN[ŨVJGTGVWTPQHCURGEKƒE4WUUKCP
threat and the emergence of a number of unruly 
non-state actors such as Islamic State. But what if 
Russias new assertiveness and the rise of IS are 
symptoms of even greater change? What if it is the 
basic structure of the international system that is 
EJCPIKPICEJCPIGVJCVKUCUUKIPKƒECPVŤRGTJCRU
even more so  as the changes following the end of 
the Cold War?
There is no doubt that the international system is 
changing and that the rules-based liberal order 
established in the wake of the Second World War is 
being challenged and is under internal strain. A 
polycentric system appears to be emerging 
characterized by plurality of power and principle and 
by changing practices (such as hybrid war) and the 
weakening of its multilateral institutions as well as the 
emergence of new ones (such as the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank).  
As new powers are rising, they challenge the under-
standing of how order in the international system 
should be maintained, and some are balancing 
against the Western powers (in Europe on NATOs 
borders  in Asia more directed against the United 
States). In addition, the demise of the Arab Spring and 
the failure of Western efforts to bring democracy and 
stability to Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya wiped some of 
The problem is that the going back to basics 
narrative emphasises one aspect of the changing 
security environment, but neglects other 
important changes.
Today we do not have the luxury to choose between collective defence and crisis 
PDQDJHPHQW)RUWKH ?UVWWLPHLQ1$72˸VKLVWRU\ZHKDYHWRGRERWK ˼
  NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, March 2015
the shine off the liberal democratic models promise 
of freedom and prosperity. 
The point is that these are changes that require more 
effort by engaging fully in all three core tasks rather 
than scaling back to just one of them.
 
A relevant NATO in a changed world
In the past NATO has had the luxury of being able to
focus on just one or two of its core tasks. In the
emerging security environment, however, the dilemma
is that the challenges on NATOs eastern and southern
flanks seem to suggest that the Alliance should hurry
back to basics by shifting its focus to collective 
defence. Yet, it would be naïve to assume that NATO 
can simply abandon its commitment to crisis 
management at a time where there has never
been more need for meeting security challenges in an
increasingly unstable neighborhood. 
Going back to basics ignores that in the new global 
environment, the United States will continue to 
rebalance towards Asia, and that alternative visions 
for international order-making are emerging.
Although there is no expectation for NATO to follow 
the United States in its rebalance towards Asia, there 
can be no doubt that the United States (no matter 
who resides in the White House from 2017) will expect 
the Europeans to do more in their own neighborhood. 
Moreover, in an environment of loosening alignments, 
differing visions of order-making and declining 
magnetism of the liberal model, partnerships will be 
needed more than ever to forge essential links across 
dividing lines, albeit that they are likely to be more 
FKHƒEWNVVQUWUVCKP
The problem is that the going back to basics narra-
tive emphasises one aspect of the changing security 
environment, but neglects other important changes 
that require NATO to focus on cooperative security 
and crisis management. In the long run going back to 
basics will make NATO irrelevant.
THE DECISIONS FROM THE WALES SUMMIT
At the Wales Summit in September 2014, Allies agreed to move towards the 2 per cent defence expenditure within a 
decade and to spend 20 per cent of that on major equipment. The Wales Summit launched a series of initiatives 
designed to bolster NATOs readiness and ability to live up to its Article Five commitments. The Readiness Action 
Plan (RAP) is based on two pillars  Assurance measures and Adaptation measures.
Assurance measures: 
Q Continuous (rotational) air, land and sea presence  
 and activity in the Eastern part of the Alliance
Q Increased Baltic air-policing
Q AWACS surveillance over the Eastern part of NATO
Q Increased sea patrols in the Baltic, Black Sea and  
 Mediterranean
Q Deployed (on a rotational basis) troops to the  
 Eastern part of NATO for training and exercises
Q 5KIPKƒECPVKPETGCUGKP0#61CPFPCVKQPCNGZGTEKUGU
Q Increased presence of air and ground forces (on a  
 bilateral basis) in Eastern parts of NATO 
Adaptation measures:
Q Enhancing the NATO Response Force (NRF)
Q As part of NRF enhancement  the establishment  
 of a new quick reaction Spearhead Force (Very  
 High Readiness Joint Task Force) 
Q Enhancing NATOs Standing Naval Forces
Q Establish a multinational NATO command and  
 control presence on the territories of NATOs Eastern  
 Allies with rotational personnel
Q Raising the readiness and capabilities of the  
 HQ Multinational Corps North East (Szczecin) and  
 enhancing its role as a hub for regional cooperation
Q Pre-positioning of military equipment and supplies
Q Improvements to NATOs ability to reinforce Eastern  
 Allies through preparation of national infrastructure  
 
CKTƒGNFUCPFRQTVU
Q Update NATO defence plans for Eastern Europe  
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The Warsaw Summit should aim to insure a relevant 
NATO for the 21st century rather than a retrenching 
Alliance characterized by going back to basics. A 
relevant NATO is able to play a full role in all three core 
tasks;
Q in collective security  by fully implementing the 
decisions taken at the Wales Summit, including 
the 2 per cent spending pledge and the speedy 
and full implementation of the Readiness Action 
Plan (RAP).
Q in cooperative security  by reassessing the role 
and function of NATOs partnerships. Although 
partnerships can be based on shared values and 
eventually lead to membership, in the emerging 
strategic environment it is more likely they will be 
based on (perhaps narrow) shared interests and 
URGEKƒERQNKE[CTGCU/QTGQXGTRCTVPGTUJKRUYKVJ
other international organizations, including the EU, 
are a pre-requisite for meeting many of the 
challenges in NATOs own neighbourhood. 
Q in crisis management  by realizing that top-table 
credibility today comes from availability to 
contribute to crisis management operations rather 
than from having a static territorial defence. Agree-
ment of, and participation in, crisis management 
operations is not an optional extra but is the 
foundation of a new implicit transatlantic bargain 
in which the  price for the continued relevance of 
the American security guarantee is an active 
contribution to order-making in the vicinity of 
Europe whilst the United States balances towards 
Asia. The improvements achieved through the 
RAP are equally relevant for crisis management as 
they are for collective defence.   
Conclusion
Going back to basics, understood as an Alliance in 
which the United States guarantees Europes security 
in much the same way as it did during the Cold War, is 
absolutely not an option. To be sure, European NATO 
members need to implement the decisions taken at 
the Wales Summit to reassure its eastern allies and to 
reinforce its readiness and collective defence capabili-
ties, but readiness and internal reassurance cannot 
come at the expense of NATOs two other core tasks. 
National positions on how to proceed span a wide 
spectrum in NATO and not all support the rebalance 
from crisis management to collective defence. Even 
so the back to basics narrative is damaging because 
it is pervasive and it implies otherwise. 
The Polish hosts for the 2016 Warsaw Summit and 
NATOs international staff should be mindful of the 
damage such a narrative can do to the long-term 
health of the Alliance. Having taken the decisions at 
Wales to increase readiness and reassurance (and 
UYKHVKORNGOGPVCVKQPKUCRQUKVKXGƒTUVUVGRVQYCTFUC
more healthy Alliance  next step is a new division of 
labour and a narrative of a more equal transatlantic 
partnership. 
